

Ex. # 1131

EXCERPTS FROM JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE FILE
(AUG. 5, 1941 to Nov. 5, 1941)

Telegram from Ambassador NOMURA to Foreign Minister
TOYODA, dated 16 Aug. 1941 (No. 703 Secretariat Code, Secret.)

p.206 Concerning your telegram No. 480.

p.207 I. As I often reported, the relations between Japan
and U. S. were brought to a very critical moment and it hangs
now on a hair. The next movement on the part of Japan may
lead to a sudden change. It is generally feared by both
Japanese and Americans that it will do so in case Japan ad-
vances into Tai-land. As we said before, the American public
is not yet in agreement as to whether they will take part in
the European War or not. And it is understood that the presi-
dent himself is worried about it, but as to the stern attitude
toward the Far East, public opinion is unified and, according
to well-informed quarters, it is said that Britain approved
of it and both China and Germany also wanted it. We don't
think both the President and the leaders in the navy will
easily go to excess as they are aware of what a matter of
grave consequence the Pacific War is. But it is said that
Britain thinks, on the other hand, if she succeeds in having
the U. S. fall in with Japan at the back door first, she will
be sure to induce the U. S. to take a hand in the European
War next. By the way, according to the prospects that are
going on here, Germany will surely win over Soviet Russia, the
war has now passed the stage of lightening war and entered
that of wear and tear. And the battles by submarines in the
Atlantic are turning to be advantageous to England and
p.209 America. In the course of a war of long duration they may
accomplish their desired purpose. The conditions at present
bear close resemblance to those of the beginning of 1917.
And it is said that they are now getting firmer and firmer
belief in their victory in the war.

p.210 II. As the condition in this country is such as we
described above, in preparing the conference as you directed
me, I must first ask the State Department for the work of an
intermediary. But as the Secretary of State is against it,
as I said before, I tried to persuade another one in the
Cabinet to make the Secretary think the matter over again,
but the man does not seem to be earnest in the matter. Be-
sides it is usual with the State Secretary to attend these
conferences. The president at one time thought of holding

p.211 conferences among the leaders of both countries. But after the Japanese advance into French Indo-China, he began to think that what Japan aims is not to fundamentally regulate the relations between Japan and the U. S., but uses the stratagem for appeasing America, and that the government at Tokyo is making a fool of me. And it is said that his special interview with me the other day was an unusual one.

p.212 Moreover, the press in Tokyo harshly commented on the proclamation recently made by both England and America and the general feeling in this place is very much against us. Anyway, unless we do not clear up all of the misunderstandings they hold now, we should never be able to accomplish our purpose. Thinking the matter politically, it is also plain that the head of a country will never go to negotiate in person with others without successful prospects. Accordingly I presume that he will surely require us (before entering into negotiation) to promise him at least something about the three points -- that is: matter of self-defense, withdrawal of the army from China, and the principle of impartiality in trade -- which were matters of great difficulties (and were not overcome) in the previous conferences, and now that we are already rejected by the Secretary of State, I am convinced that in order to accomplish the design you instructed me, I must think the matter over carefully and prepare it from the beginning. As it is said that the president will come back in a few days, please think over the above-mentioned points once again and send me a telegram of instructions in any case in haste. (The end).

No. 35375-135-378, 13 Sept. 1941. at 11:30 p.m.

p.715 Telegram from Foreign Minister TOYODA to Ambassador NOMURA, dated 13 Sept. 1941 (No. 560, ~~Secretariat~~ Code). (urgent)
Ambassadors

Concerning our telegram No. 529.

p.716 1. According your telegram No. 798, I understand that the matters in the above said telegram are not yet taken into consideration by the president, but our government presented the matters in the telegram to America because substantially they cover all the points hitherto unsettled and (a) thinking of preparatory negotiations, (b) but at the same time avoiding the prolongation of the negotiation after we enter into the minute discussion about the details as such a negotiation is bound to be (c) thus hastening to realize the conference between the heads of the two countries. (We can hardly expect a prompt settle-

p.717 ment if the staff officers have discussions with elaborate arguments; thus we believe it imperative that the heads of state of the two countries meet and hold discussions in a political manner.) I wrote the draft of agreement that is to be negotiated from a wide view of things between Japan and America at the meeting, and confidentially showed it beforehand. (Your explanation to Secretary HULL concerning this is very much to the point and I am glad of it). And wishing to have the matters in the above said telegram shown to the president himself in a hurry and to hear from him his opinions concerning them, I presented the draft to the American Ambassador on the evening of the 13th. So take measures as you think fit in your place considering all I mentioned above.

p.718 II. It can be clearly seen from our previous telegrams and part one of the present telegram that we do not narrowdown the topics we had in the private conferences hitherto held as HULL remarks, but rather expanded the substances of the topics as you will clearly see in the telegram, I quoted at the beginning of the present one (tel. 529). That is the reason we are stressing that the matter should be settled from a wide view of things. Therefore I wish to realize the two countries' heads meeting at the earliest time with the telegram (tel. 529) I quoted at the beginning of the present one, as the text of their talk for the time being and with as few business and legal discussions as possible, and after that they may resume the former negotiation in case of need.

p.719

p.720 III. I understand that the U. S. wants us to acknowledge her so-called four fundamental principles. But without even settling the matters in the telegram quoted at the beginning (tel. 529) of the present one we are not in a position to swallow it at present. Besides (if we do so) it is very much feared that the world may think we did it owing to American pressure as we pointed out before, and judging from American views that she wants to negotiate beforehand with England, Holland, China and other countries, I entertain some apprehensions lest they may try to revive the organization of the "Nine Countries Treaty". So it is

p.721 also not proper to do so at present. The form of negotiation between Japan and the U. S. should be adopted. As this is of special importance, beware of it please! (We are not in a position to hinder U. S. from her actual negotiation with Britain, Holland and others, and in reality it is impossible to do it, and again we will not concern ourselves with it. At the bottom, what we want to say is that we refuse to be induced to a council or an agreement among numerous countries.)

p.722

IV. What I said above does not intend to reject the questions raised in your telegrams No. 804 and nine No. 557. But I presented aforesaid two plans and stress the more importance on what I said in the telegram I quoted at the beginning of the present one (tel. 529). I am going to reply to the above two telegrams in the near future. I tell this for your information.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 1457 (Part 1)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 16 Aug. 1941, and described as follows: Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Toyoda, dated 16 Aug. 1941

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

1st day of Nov., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

1st day of Nov., 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2d Lt. AUSMI
NAME

Witness: /s/ William C. Prout

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1457 (Part 2)Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 8 pages, dated 13 Sept., 1941 and described as follows: Telegram from Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura dated 13 Sept. 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number of citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this1st day of Nov., 1946.
/s/ K. Hayashi
 Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo
Chief, Archives Section
 Official Capacity
Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this1st day of Nov., 1946
/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2d Lt. AUSMI
 NAME
Witness: /s/ William C. Prout
Investigator, IPS
 Official Capacity

Not read

1457

Ex 1131

昭和十六年八月十六日

又華月報

八月十七日

前本省署

(機)

野村大使

豐田外務大臣

第七〇三号

貴電第四八〇号ニ関シ

(一) 果次郎報告致之通日米関係ニシテ真ニ危機一髪、所ニ到
着シ日本ノ水、動キ依リ急轉ス、惧アリ、泰進駐ヲ見ニ
於テモ形勢、急変ヲ見ハシトハ殆ド日米平人一般、見解
ナリ、既報、通「歐洲参戦」ハホタ輿論一致ニ至ラズ大統領
モ爾ハシテハ趣カレニ反シ極東ニ對シ強硬論ニ對シテ、
輿論一致ノ消息通、云フ所ニ依ルハ夫ハ英國モ賛成ニ支那モ
懸念モ望ム所ナリトコトナリ

米大統領モ海軍省廳モ太平洋戦争ノ大事業タリ如カ故
腔端、決定交易ニ動カレトガハ人ト云ハルモ一面英國ノ米國ニ

No. 1

ビクトリアニ於テ日米戦争コトナリ、蓋シ英國ノ歐洲戦争ニ
トク見ハアリト云フモ由ナリ

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

1457

尙当方面、見所ハ独逸ハ、聯邦ニ勝ニ相違ナキ
 无戦争ニ速戦速決、域ヲ脱シ漸ク消滅ナキ大西洋
 潜水艦戦ヲ策ミ、爲有利ニ展開シ長期戦ヲ要間ニ所
 期、目的ヲ達成シ得可リ今日、概ネ一九一七年初頭、情勢ニ
 影響タリト考ヘ居リ勝利、信念昂マリテ趣也

(三) 当國、情勢右ノ如キ時御訓令、会談ニ付テハ國務省ニ最ク
 請ハサレ得ス、而シテ國務長官、客ハ見報、通否定ムル以
 テ其後長官、反省ニ関シ一關係ヲ動ラントスモ同氏ハ餘
 リ氣味、様子ナリ而シテ会談ハ國務長官臨弗スル例トス
 大統領ハ曾テ兩國首腦會談、考アリモ御印進駐以テ日
 本、迄ス所ハ日米國交、根本調整ニテ進米國ニ對シテ、
 メントニ戰略ニ出テ居リ本使、如キハ東京ヨリツカレサレ居
 モト考ヘ出シタル趣ヲ週報本使ヲ將ニ引見シタル例外、
 措置ニ由リ且、度ノ英米聲明ニ對シテ東京新聞ハ平報
 批評ヲ加ヘ居リ空氣極メテ悪シ此、殊何カチテ此、誤解ヲ
 一掃スルニテサレバ目的ヲ達シ難シ尙又政治的ニ考ヘ一國、元首
 カ成功、見込ハシテハ出馬スル要ナリ從テ先般、話合

No. 2

1457

「支那の自衛権問題、支那は、撤兵、通商、無差別主義、三条件を以て之を要求し、言實に、要望之に相違なく、思考、先づ、既に國務長官は拒否せられたる、今日御命令、越旨に達成する、相当、考慮、と均く工作、必要、と痛感、と云ふ事なり。

No. 3

大統領、二兩月中、三條、由、上に付、右諸条、考慮、上、何分、御報告、進に報告、を請ふ、(了)

(三〇六—二二頁)

1457

二我方ハ此ノ調心カヤリ従来、非公式会談ヲ「トモダシ」
居ルハ屢次、實報及前頭ニ依リ明白ナリ。否、寧ろ従来
ノ話合、事實ヲ擴大シ居ルハ冒頭愛ノ内容、然ラズ明瞭ニ
我方ハ大局的見地ヨリ之ヲ解決ヲ強調シ居ルモ右ニ基リ「外」
ナス。

四「冒頭愛」現下、話合ト、根幹トノ事務的、法律的論議ハ之ヲ
最ハ限度トシ、両首脳部ノ会見ヲ速カニ實現シ、其後必要
ニ依リ従来ノ交渉ニ復第ニ可ナトノ意見ナリ。

三米側、我方ニ此ヲ謂フ四原則、承認ヲ求メ居ルカ如キ此
ノ「冒頭愛」ニ関スル解決モ見ス之ヲ「揚子」トスルハ出長ナ
斯合ナカ、尙我方カ従来拾遺ヤリ通リ米「ソート」ニ依
ル「ソート」觀ヲ與ヘ供ヘ多分「ソート」ニ依リ又決斷及その他
ノ諸國ト豫メ話合、要「ソート」スルハ「意圖」ハナク國際的機
關、實話トモ解釋スルハ供ナリ。此ノ際適當ナリ又日米兩
國間、話合ト、形「ソート」コト緊要ナリ。右ハ特ニ重要ナル付御
注意願ヒテ（但シ此カ事實上決斷等ト話合ト「ソート」
之ヲ阻止スル場合トモ非ズ又事實上阻止不可能ニ至ルモ我方
ノ「關與」ハ所「ソート」スル要ハ多數國會議乃至協定ニ事ナリト拒否

No. 5

1457

スル(意ナリ)

四. 尚右ハ貴賓(第ハ。四号)往(第五五七号)ノ如キ質問ヲ
拒否スルモ、ハ非ズ右ニ本建キトノ主張ヲ冒頭(置カント云々、
三前記ニ對ス)同感ハ近ク親報ス御金ニ此

(七五—七三頁)

No. 5

No. 5

Asahi Nichi Nichi



TODAY'S WEATHER

Tokyo: Fair, showers. (S).
 Yokohama: Generally fair. (SE).
 Nagoya: Generally fair. (S).
 Kyoto: Generally fair. (S).
 Osaka: Generally fair. (SW).
 Kobe: Generally fair. (SW).
 Shimonoseki: Generally fair. (E).

SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1941

SATURDAY, AUGUST 30, 1941

Speedy Expansion Of Armaments And Autarchy Of East Asia Sought

COMMODITY MOBILIZATION PLAN STUDIED

**Program For 2nd Quarter Of Fiscal Year Decided As
Proposed By Governor Of Planning Board;
Key Points Of Scheme Announced**

The Government, at the Cabinet meeting on August 22, formally decided the national commodity mobilization plan for and after the 2nd quarter of the 1941-2 fiscal year, as proposed by Lieut.-General Teiichi Suzuki, governor of the Planning Board.

The key points of the scheme are: (1) Prompt expansion of armaments; (2) Establishment of a system of autarchy for important resources in the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, especially the maintenance of steel and coal production; (3) Maintenance of the lowest limit for the nation's living necessities; and (4) Strict harmony between the commodity mobilization scheme and the marine transportation plan.

Verbal Statement Issued By Governor Suzuki

The scheme had eagerly been studied by the Planning Board and the related Offices in order to establish a strong wartime system in the midst of the complicated international situation.

Governor Suzuki of the Planning Board introduced and explained the scheme in detail at the August 22 Cabinet meeting, it having been drafted among those concerned. The plan was formally approved after discussion.

The Government the same afternoon issued a communique in the form of verbal statement by Governor Suzuki, as follows:

"The Government previously set the scheme for the enforcement of the commodity mobilization plan for the 1st quarter of the 1941-2 fiscal

year. The Government however has examined and studied various measures necessary for the completion of the wartime system in response to the international situation which has since undergone a sudden change. The Government thus drafted the commodity mobilization scheme for and after the 2nd quarter of the 1941-2 fiscal year and obtained the Cabinet decision on it today.

"In the current scheme, importance is attached to the 4 points (already listed) aimed at the complete execution of the China Emergency and the prompt completion of the wartime system to meet the new international situation.

"As regards the supply of commodities for the 1941-2 fiscal year, various counter-measures have been taken in anticipation of a situation in which imports from third powers might become difficult. Accordingly, there is no fear that a hitch will occur in the execution of this commodity mobilization scheme.

"A proper cut has been effected in commodities for Government or civilian consumption. Efforts will be made in order to be able to secure the best results with the minimum resources, through such measures as the increase of efficiency, rationalization of consumption, and adjusting of distribution organs based on their relative importance.

"Simultaneously the Government will urge the reclamation of more resources and strengthen consumption control designed for the smooth execution of the commodity mobilization scheme.

"The enforcement of the commodity mobilization scheme depends upon a strong war sense and the cooperation of officials and the people. The nation, with indomitable determination to deal with the situation, is requested to strive, acting with the Government as one body, for the establishment of the foundation of national prosperity."

Ambassador Nomura Sees Roosevelt; Premier Konoe's Message Delivered

CONVICTION TOLD ON PACIFIC PROBLEMS

**Japanese Envoy Confers With USA Chief Executive
For 45 Minutes; Secretary Of State Hull
Present; Pending Matters Discussed**

The Cabinet sat in an extraordinary session on Friday, August 29, from 1.30 to 2.10 p.m., in addition to the regular Cabinet meeting in the morning, in view of the mounting tension in the international situation.

Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, Foreign Minister, reported in detail the latest diplomatic negotiations with the United States to his Cabinet colleagues in the presence of Major-General Akira Muto, chief of the military affairs bureau; Rear-Admiral Masazumi Oka, chief of the naval affairs bureau; and Taro Terasaki, director of the Foreign Office's American bureau.

Doc #2534-E

30-AUG-1941

-11-

Friday August 8, 1941

Thought Problems Council

The first meeting of the Thought Problems Council since the formation of the third Konoe Cabinet was held at the official residence of Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoe on August 7 at 2 p.m.

The future policy of the unit was discussed among Minister Without Portfolio Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, Minister Without Portfolio Lieut.-General Heisuke Yanagawa, Minister Without Portfolio Lieut.-General Sadaichi Suzuki, Home Minister Harumichi Tanabe, Justice Minister Michiyo Iwamura, and Privy Councillor Hiroshi Minami.

Doc #2534-D

23-AUG-1941

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Doc #2534 C

8-AUG-1941

-11-

We Also Publish
In Nipponese
The Osaka Mainichi
The Tokyo Nichi Nichi
With Combined Circulation
Of 3,500,000 Daily

Sunday Mainichi, Braille Mainichi,
Economist, Year Book, Home Life,
Mainichi Children's Daily, Tonichi
Children's Daily, 'Dai Nippon
Seinen', Chinese Mainichi

A National

The Tok